What is an AI system inventory?

An AI system inventory, also called an AI register or AI asset inventory, is a maintained record of every AI system an organisation uses or builds. Each record states the owner, purpose, vendor, models, deployment, the data that can reach it, how outputs are reviewed, its risk and its approval status. Risk assessment, approval, enforcement and audit all start from it.

Frameworks treat it as a base control. The NIST AI Risk Management Framework, under GOVERN 1.6, expects mechanisms to be in place to inventory AI systems, resourced according to organisational risk priorities. In practice the hard part is not the format. It is keeping the facts true.

Why "unknown" must be a value

A first inventory is full of gaps. A tool seen in proxy logs has no known owner. A SaaS vendor cannot say which model sits behind a feature. Nobody has checked whether personal data reaches it.

If the field is left blank, or filled with a hopeful "no", the gap disappears from view. A blank personal data field reads as "none" in a report, and a system with no recorded risk looks low risk. Make "unknown" an explicit value in every field that matters, and treat it as a reason for review, never as safe. Counting unknowns per system is also a fair measure of how mature the inventory is.

The fields that matter

FieldWhy it mattersWho supplies it
System nameA stable label people recognise, used in approvals and reportsBusiness owner
Business ownerSomeone accountable for the use and its outcomesGovernance lead assigns, owner accepts
Technical ownerSomeone who can answer how it is built, configured and connectedEngineering or IT
PurposeRisk depends on use: the same model is low risk for drafting and higher risk for decisions about peopleBusiness owner
VendorLinks the system to vendor due diligence and contractsProcurement
ModelsModel changes can change behaviour, cost and data termsTechnical owner, vendor
DeploymentSaaS feature, API, self-hosted or agent: each has different controlsTechnical owner
Data categories that can reach itThe main input to privacy and security riskBusiness and technical owners
Personal data (yes, no, unknown)Triggers privacy review and, where relevant, a DPIA decisionBusiness owner, DPO confirms
Human review of outputsShows whether a person checks outputs before they have effectBusiness owner
Linked agents or MCP serversTools that can delete or run commands raise the risk of the whole systemTechnical owner
Provenance (observed, declared)Shows whether the record rests on evidence, a statement, or bothSecurity, owner
Risk levelSets the depth of review and the review cycleRisk or governance function
EU AI Act classification by the organisationRecords the organisation's own determination, made with counselLegal, compliance
Last assessment dateShows how fresh the facts areGovernance function
Approval status and end dateMakes approval explicit and forces review when it expiresApprover
NotesConditions, exceptions and open questionsAnyone, reviewed by the owner

Observed versus declared records

Records arrive in two ways. An observed record comes from evidence: proxy or DNS logs, a gateway, an endpoint inventory. It proves use but says nothing about purpose. A declared record comes from a person who states the purpose, owner and data. It explains the use but proves nothing on its own.

Keep both and say which is which. An observation should become a full record only when a person confirms it is a real AI system in use and supplies the owner and purpose. A declared system that never appears in traffic is also worth a question: it may be unused, or it may be reaching the provider by a route you do not see.

How to populate it

  1. Start from logs. Match a few weeks of proxy and DNS logs against a list of AI providers. Each match is an observed candidate.
  2. Add gateway traffic. If applications call models through a gateway, each API key, team or application is a candidate with models and volumes already known.
  3. Check procurement. Review contracts and renewals for AI services and for AI features added to tools you already pay for.
  4. Collect declarations. Send a short form to teams asking what AI they use, for what and with which data. Keep it to a few questions.
  5. Reconcile. Merge observed and declared candidates, assign owners and mark every gap as unknown.
  6. Classify and decide. Assess risk from the recorded facts, then approve with conditions and an end date, replace or block.

How to keep it current

  • Feed new observations in continuously rather than in a yearly survey
  • Make a model change, a new data category or a new linked agent trigger a review
  • Give every approval an end date
  • Tie the procurement and renewal process to the inventory
  • Keep the history of each record, so you can show what was true when a decision was made
  • Report unknowns and expired approvals to the governance forum

Common mistakes

MistakeConsequenceBetter practice
Listing vendors, not systemsOne vendor hides several uses with different risksOne record per system and purpose
Blank fieldsGaps read as safe in reportsUse "unknown" and review it
Survey onlyUndeclared use never appearsCombine logs, gateway and declarations
Ignoring AI inside SaaSFeatures switched on after approval go unrecordedReview approved tools for new AI features
No agents or tools recordedThe riskiest capabilities are missingRecord linked agents and MCP servers with their tools
Approvals without end datesRecords go stale and nobody reviews themSet an end date and a review trigger

Checklist

  • One owner for the inventory, and a business and technical owner per record
  • "Unknown" accepted as a value and treated as a reason for review
  • Provenance recorded as observed, declared or both
  • Logs, gateway, procurement and declarations all feeding it
  • Agents and MCP servers linked to the systems that use them
  • Risk level and the organisation's own regulatory classification recorded
  • Every approval with conditions and an end date

Download the template

Download the AI system inventory template (CSV). It contains the columns above and two clearly fictional example rows, one declared and one observed, so you can see how "unknown" is used. Open it in any spreadsheet tool and replace the examples with your own systems.

Sources: NIST AI RMF Playbook, GOVERN 1.6. Regulatory classification is a determination for the organisation and its counsel; this guide is not legal advice.

How MERIDVAR keeps the inventory

MERIDVAR is software you install and operate on your own network, so the inventory stays on your infrastructure and nothing is sent to us.

  • Two sources. Systems are observed in gateway traffic, uploaded proxy and DNS logs and endpoint agents, or declared by a person, with owner, purpose, vendor, models, lifecycle status and provenance.
  • People confirm. An observation becomes a record only when a person confirms it.
  • Agents and tools. Agents have signed identities, and MCP servers are declared with tool-level risk. A tool that can delete or run commands raises the risk of every linked AI system.
  • Unknown is never safe. Rules-based classification gives a reason for every factor, and approvals read "review required" when facts change.

The product is in beta. See AI governance and the product overview.